





# Human Factors in Security Management, Social Engineering & Privacy Enhancing Technologies

Dr. Sebastian Pape





## Motivation



- Interaction: humans and technology
- Many 'problems' technically solved
  - e.g. encryption
- But...
  - Users can also be attacked
     → can be weakest link
  - Best choice often not clear
     → decision support needed
  - Users do not use technology
    - → technology acceptance needs to be considered



## **Privacy Enhancing Technologies**

- **Technology Acceptance** 
  - **Economical Interests**

### **Social Engineering** •

- Tool Support
- Threat Elicitation
- **Awareness Training**

#### **Security Management** •

- **Risk Assessment / Management**
- **Decision Support**

## Agenda





## Social Engineering








## Social Engineering



The clever manipulation of the natural human tendency to trust!

Source: cybertec-security.com

### Breach vectors leading to compromise:



Source: PWC Information Security Breaches Survey 2017



## **Social Engineering Tools**


- Most tools only for collecting information (1 exception)
- No support for defenders, e.g. for
  - Risk management
  - Creation of security policies
- Prediction
  - More data available
  - Use of artificial intelligence
    - e.g. synthesized speech



Beckers, K.; Schosser, D.; Pape, S. and Schaab, P.: A Structured Comparison of Social Engineering Intelligence Gathering Tools. In Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business - 14th International Conference, TrustBus 2017

## **Security Awareness**





Peter Schaab, Kristian Beckers, and Sebastian Pape. Social engineering defence mechanisms and counteracting training strategies. Information and Computer Security, 25(2):206–222, 2017



## Social Engineering Defense

Dimension		IT Defense Mechanism	Psychological Defense Mechanism
		Policy Compliance	
		Security Awareness Program	Forewarning
Knowledge	Attitude		Persuasion Knowledge
			Attitude Bolstering
			Reality Check
		Audit	
			Inoculation
	Behaviour		Decision Making

Peter Schaab, Kristian Beckers, and Sebastian Pape. Social engineering defence mechanisms and counteracting training strategies. Information and Computer Security, 25(2):206–222, 2017



## Idea: Serious Games


- Games can be fun
   → gets employees involved
- Games provide a realm
   → encourages employees to be creative
- Fictional situations are discussed in the game → no one is to blame
- Games are intended to be engaging and entertaining

 $\rightarrow$  which gets employees to play again and again






## Serious Games





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
#### **Attack Scenarios**



**Dumpster Diving** 

Dumpster Diving is the act of analysing the documents and other things in a garbage bin of an organisation to reveal sensitive information.

### Principles



The Herd Principle

Even the most suspicious victims will let their guard down when everyone next to them appears to share the same risk. Exploit your victims by following a herd that you control.

#### Attacker Type



**Inside Attacker** 

An insider is a known member of the organization who has already established trust.

### Design: Kristina Femmer





## Real World: Threat Elicitation



Kristian Beckers and Sebastian Pape. A serious game for eliciting social engineering security requirements. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE International Conference on Requirements Engineering, RE '16. IEEE Computer Society, 2016



## Virtual Scenario: Training




### Design: Kristina Femmer

Kristian Beckers, Sebastian Pape, and Veronika Fries. HATCH: Hack and trick capricious humans – a serious game on social engineering. In Proceedings of the 2016 British HCI Conference, Bournemouth, United Kingdom, July 11-15, 2016.







Ludger Goeke, Alejandro Quintanar, Kristian Beckers, and Sebastian Pape. PROTECT - an easy configurable serious game to train employees against social engineering attacks. In Computer Security - ESORICS 2019 International Workshops, IOSec, MSTEC, and FINSEC, volume 11981 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2019.



## CyberSecurity Awareness Quiz

Question	What is the biggest threat in this scenario?
Scenario	You get an email which contains the logo of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and has a zip file as attachment. The email does not start with a personal salutation, but with a general introduction. The email text states that the attachment contains an e-book which provides cruial information about the corona virus and a guidance which explains how you can protect yourself and others during the pandemic. It emphasis the importance of the e-book, especially regarding the protection of children and business centeres.
Please select the correct answers	<ul> <li>The sender of the email is not the WHO and your computer gets compromised because the attachment is malicious</li> <li>Because the email contains the logo of a wellknown organisation there is no way that your computer gets compromised when you open the attachment.</li> <li>If you do not open the attachment, the chance that you get infected with COVID-19 increases significantly.</li> <li>Because of the current situation, it is irresponsible to not open the attachment because without the provided information you endanger your fellow human beings.</li> </ul>

Time for Question	Question	Points	lives	Next Question
177	1 / 6	0	•••	

Sebastian Pape, Ludger Goeke, Alejandro Quintanar, and Kristian Beckers. Conceptualization of a cybersecurity awareness quiz. In Computer Security - ESORICS 2020 International Workshops MSTEC, 2020.

## Security Management






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## Riskmanagement






Christopher Schmitz and Sebastian Pape. Lisra: Lightweight security risk assessment for decision support in information security. Computers & Security, 90, 2020.

Michael Schmid and Sebastian Pape. A structured comparison of the corporate information security. In ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection - 34th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2019, Lisbon, Portugal, June 25-27, 2019, pages 223–237, 2019.

## Riskmanagement





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
## Security Maturity Levels



**Table 1:** Description of the COBIT 5 Maturity Levels


Level	Maturity Levels Description
0–Incomplete	The control is not implemented or fails to
	achieve its purpose.
1–Performed	The implemented control achieves its pro-
	cess purpose.
2–Managed	The level 1 performed control is now im-
	plemented in a managed fashion (planned,
	monitored and adjusted) and its work prod-
	ucts are appropriately established, con-
	trolled and maintained.
3–Established	The level 2 managed control is now imple-
	mented using a defined process that is ca-
	pable of achieving its process outcomes.
4–Predictable	The level 3 established control now oper-
	ates within defined limits to achieve its pro-
	cess outcomes.
5–Optimising	The level 4 predictable control is contin-
	uously improved to meet relevant current
	and projected business goals.






Christopher Schmitz, Michael Schmid, David Harborth and Sebastian Pape: Maturity Level Assessments of Information Security Controls: An Empirical Analysis of Practitioners' Assessment Capabilities, Submitted to Computers & Security, Minor Revision











Company premises	<b>G1</b> Please assess the COBIT maturity levels for the security controls on the left side according to the described scenario. You can also open the previous descriptions by
(4) Video surveillance (3) Access control by gatekeepers	<ul> <li>(7) clicking on the links.</li> <li>The security controls are defined in Section 11 'physical and environmental security', sub-section 11.1 'secure areas' of the ISO/IEC 27002. <sup>8</sup></li> </ul>
Server roomPrimate(5) Location of the server room(2) Security policy(6) Working guidelines(2) Security policy(9) Backups(2) Security policy(9) Backups(1) -15(1) Less than 1(1) -15(1) Less than 1(1) -15(1) -5(1) -15(1) -5(1) -15(1) -5(1) -15(1) -5(1) -15(1) -5(1) -15(2) Security so far?(1) -15(2) CISSP(1) -15(2) Security so far?(1) -15(3) Security so far?(1) -15(3) Security so far?(1) -15(4) Security so far?(1) -15(5) Security so far?<	rity perimeters should be defined and used to protect areas that contain either sensitive or critical information and information pro- cessing facilities.       Image: Control to the text of the text of tex
ISO/IEC 27001 Lead • Other <sup>3</sup> Auditor)	eas and other points where unauthorised per- sons could enter the premises should be con- trolled and, if possible, isolated from infor- mation processing facilities to avoid unau- thorised access.

## Methodology




- Survey (N=56)
  - Scenario
  - Demographics
  - Assessments
  - Justification (Activities to reach next level)
  - Challenges / Difficulties / Confidence
- Interviews (N=7, 20-30min)
  - Agreement
  - Assessment of Challenge
  - Possible Assistance for Task
- Quantitative & Qualitative Evaluation




## Participants (N=56)



Number of employees






Independent Variables	Group	o Size
	yes	no
Longtime work exp.	18	38
Longtime ISO/IEC 27002 exp.	16	40
CMM/CMMI/SSE-CMM exp.	26	30
CISM/CISA certificate	20	36
IT-Grundschutz certificate	10	46
ISMS certificate	14	42
ISO/IEC 27001 certificate	26	30
Without certificate	12	44

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## Results I






Control	Control Description	Scenario Maturity Level	Qualitative Feedback
C 5.1.1	Policies for information security	2 - Managed	Question F1
C 5.1.2	Review of the policies for information security	0 - Incomplete	
C 11.1.1	Physical security perimeter	2 - Managed	Question H1
C 11.1.2	Physical entry controls	3 - Established	
C 11.1.3	Securing offices, rooms and facilities	2 - Managed	
C 11.1.4	Protecting against external and environmental threats	3 - Established	
C 11.1.5	Working in secure areas	0 - Incomplete	
C 11.1.6	Delivery and loading areas	3 - Established	
C 12.6.1	Management of technical vulnerabilities	4 - Predictable	Question J1
C 12.6.2	Restrictions on software installation	0 - Incomplete	


## Results II



#### Section K: Confidence

**K1** In total, you have assessed the maturity levels for ten security controls. For how many of them have you been uncertain?





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## **Results III**

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**Table 5:** Analysis of the professional characteristics for the top andbottom 25% practitioners

Professional Characteristics	Number of Occur. for		
	25th Perc.	75th Perc.	
Longtime work exp.	11 (79%)	5 (36%)	
Longtime ISO/IEC 27002 exp.	7 (50%)	3 (21%)	
CMM/CMMI/SSE-CMM exp.	9 (64%)	4 (28%)	
CISM/CISA certificate	7 (50%)	2 (14%)	
IT-Grundschutz certificate	5 (35%)	1(7%)	
ISMS certificate	9 (64%)	0(0%)	
ISO/IEC 27001 certificate	10 (71%)	4 (28%)	
Without certificate	1(7%)	4 (28%)	

**Table 6:** T-tests analysing differences between certain groups for the deviation of the practitioners' assessments and the scenario maturity levels.

Independent Variables	Group Size		t-value
	yes	no	
Longtime work exp.	18	38	<i>n.s.</i>
Longtime ISO/IEC 27002 exp.	16	40	<i>n.s.</i>
CMM/CMMI/SSE-CMM exp.	26	30	<i>n.s.</i>
CISM/CISA certificate	20	36	2.1056*
IT-Grundschutz certificate	10	46	2.1482*
ISMS certificate	14	42	3.4833**
ISO/IEC 27001 certificate	26	30	2.6762**
Without certificate	12	44	n.s.

\* and \*\* asterisks indicate statistical significance at 5%-level and 1%-level

**Table 7:** Spearman's rank correlation indicating statistically significant correlations between certain groups for the number of assessments perceived as incorrect and the actual number of incorrect assessments.

Group Size	ρ
18	-0.3911*
16	-0.5717*
26	-0.4981*
20	n.s.
10	n.s.
14	n.s.
26	n.s.
12	n.s.
56	n.s.
	18 16 26 20 10 14 26 12

\* and \*\* asterisks indicate statistical significance at 5%-level and 1%-level

### Results IV

Total numbers:




Figure 7: Distribution of codes for certain groups

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## Results V



- Reasons for Exaggerated Measures
  - Individual background (regulated sectors)
  - No economic considerations
- Challenges
  - Scope for interpretation
  - Differentation between maturity levels
  - Control dependencies
  - Mapping controls to processes
  - Lack of skills
  - Difficulties
    - Internal / external assessments
    - Not all controls represent processes
    - Transition between maturity levels

- Support
  - Discussion in teams
  - Examples
  - Trainings
  - Catalogue of measures



## Summary

- Participants struggled with the assessments
  - Scenario vs. own company
  - Economic considerations
  - Wiggle room
- Assessors with certificate performed better
- Practitioners overconfident

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- Limitations
  - Scenario
  - Subset of controls
  - Self-selection bias

# CONCLUSION




## Privacy Enhancing Technologies







## Anonymity Networks



- Investigate users intention to use Tor / Jondonym
- Compare differences

## Methodology




- Constructs adapted from existing literature:
  - technology acceptance factors (Venkatesh and Davis 2000, Venkatesh et al. 2012)
  - trust (Pavlou 2003)
  - perceived anonymity (Benenson et al. 2015)
- German and English-speaking users of JonDonym and Tor acquired
  - during the rollout of a new browser and on the official homepage (Jondonym)
  - via the Tor mailing list (+ diverse other channels to reach Tor users)
- Constructs translated into German with two certified translators
- Active users (N=141 for JonDonym + 124 for Tor)
- Partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) with SmartPLS 3.2.7 (Ringle et al. 2015)
- Coding of answers by two coders

## Internet Users' Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC)




35



Malhotra, Kim & Agarwal: Internet users' information privacy concerns (IUIPC): The construct, the scale, and a causal model, Information Systems Research 15(4), 2004




## IUIPC: Tor (Jondonym)



David Harborth and Sebastian Pape. How privacy concerns and trust and risk beliefs influence users' intentions to use privacyenhancing technologies – the case of tor. In 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 2019, 2019.

## TAM: Tor / Jondonym






David Harborth, Sebastian Pape, and Kai Rannenberg. Explaining the technology use behavior of privacyenhancing technologies: The case of tor and jondonym. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2020(2):111–128, 2020.

## TAM: Tor / Jondonym - Diffs





David Harborth, Sebastian Pape, and Kai Rannenberg. Explaining the technology use behavior of privacyenhancing technologies: The case of tor and jondonym. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2020(2):111–128, 2020.

## Qualitative Results – Concepts



Concepts	Subconcepts	Common to both PETs	Specific Subconcepts for Tor	Specific Subconcepts for JD
	PET design	Feature Requests (Tor.1, Jon.1)	Malicious exit nodes (Tor.2)	Location of mix cascades (Jon.2)
	Compatibility	Accessibility of websites		
Statements		(Tor.3, Jon.3)		
about	Usability	Documentation (Tor.4, Jon.4)		
Technical		Ease of use (Tor.5, Jon.5)		
Issues		Missing knowledge to use it cor-		
		rectly (Tor.6, Jon.6)		
	Performance	Latency (Tor.7, Jon.7, Jon.8)		
	Anonymity	Concerns about deanonymiza-		Size of the user base (Jon.11)
		tion ( <b>Tor.8</b> , <b>Jon.9</b> )		
		Reason of use (Tor.9, Jon.10)		
Beliefs and	Consequences	Fear of investigations	Beliefs about social effects	
Percep-		(Tor.10, Tor.11, Jon.12)	(Tor.13, Tor.14)	
tions	Trust		Trust in the community	Trust in technology (Jon.13)
			(Tor.12)	
	Substitute	Best available tool		Tor as reference technology
	technologies	(Tor.15, Jon.14)		(Jon.3, Jon.8, Jon.11)
	Costs			Lower costs, other pricing scheme
Statements				(Jon.15)
about	Payment			Easy, anonymous payment optior
Economical	methods			(Jon.15)
Issues	Use cases		Circumvent Censorship	Willingness to pay in certain scenario
			(Tor.16)	(Jon.16, Jon.17)

## Qualitative Results – Concepts



- Tor usage "stands out"
- ... having a cop boot at my door because of Tor. By using the service [Jondonym], am I automatically marked by intelligence authorities as a potential terrorist, ...
- Only social backlash from people thinking that Tor is mostly used for illegal activities For the same reason I don't hang out in brothels, using Tor makes you look like a criminal

		rectly (Tor.6,Jon.6)		
	Performance	Latency (Tor.7, Jon.7, Jon.8)		
-	Anonymity	Concerns about deanonymiza-		Size of the user base $(Jon.11)$
		tion ( <b>Tor.8</b> , <b>Jon.9</b> )		
		Reason of use (Ior.9, Jon.10)		
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			(Tor.12)	
	Substitute	Best available tool		Tor as reference technology
	technologies	(Tor.15, Jon.14)		(Jon.3, Jon.8, Jon.11)
	Costs			Lower costs, other pricing schemes
Statements				(Jon.15)
about	Payment			Easy, anonymous payment options
Economical	methods			(Jon.15)
Issues	Use cases		Circumvent Censorship	Willingness to pay in certain scenarios
			(Tor.16)	(Jon.16, Jon.17)

## **PET Economics**



### $WTP/WTD_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot RP_i + \beta_2 \cdot VIC_i + \beta_3 \cdot TRUST_i + \beta_4 \cdot TRUST_{PET,i} + \beta_5 \cdot TOR/JD_i + \epsilon_i$

	WTP for JonDonym		WTD	Difference						
Factor	Coefficient	Avg. marg.	Coefficient	Avg. marg.	Avg. marg.					
		effect		effect	effect					
(Intercept)	-0.0376	-0.0081	6.1455***	-0.9768	0.9687					
Risk Propensity	-0.4967**	-0.1067	-0.1492	-0.0237	-0.083					
Privacy Victim	-0.0397	-0.0085	0.3352**	0.0533	-0.0618					
Trust	-0.0868	-0.0187	-0.1222	-0.0194	0.0007					
Trust <sub>PET</sub>	0.5661***	0.1217	0.7835***	0.1245	-0.0028					
Knowing Tor/Jondonym	-0.5792	-0.1245	0.488	0.0776	-0.2021					
Significance: $p < 0.05$ , $p < 0.01$ , $p < 0.001$										

Table 4.4: Tor and Jondonym Users, Logistic Regression Model for Willingness to Donate/Pay [82]

David Harborth, Xinyuan Cai, and Sebastian Pape. Why do people pay for privacy? In ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection - 34th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2019.

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## Conclusion




- Trust
  - Acceptance of PETs
  - Social engineering attacks
- Economics
  - PETs
  - Security Management
- Regulations
  - Can foster adoption
  - Can hinder provision



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## Study about Corona Warn-App





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Sebastian Pape, David Harborth, Jacob Leon Kröger: Privacy Concerns Go Hand in Hand with Lack of Knowledge: The Case of the German Corona-Warn-App, Submitted to IFIP SEC 2021

## Sensor-based Inference Attacks on Wearables

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
Table 12. Daily Life Activity Inference Attacks

Subcater.	Sensors Sory Actualors and Dev.	de la contraction de la contractione de la contract	Accuracy (in ?)	* Device Mode,	* Test c.	Lúmitations	Privace	Sophie Loss	Maturi: Alication	Reference
uo	ACC, GYR	□ ■ 3 activities (walk, in moving vehicle, static)	° 60 <sup>F</sup>	1 😐 Y	10▼	🔶 Dat	Ø	•	*	[21]
recognition	ACC		• 84	1 🔹 N	33▼	•	90	۰	$\star$	[89]
	ACC, GYR		<u> </u>	1 💼 N	32▼	🔶 Pos	<b>Ø</b> 2	۰	$\star$	[139]
	ACC		• 84	3 🔷 Y	16♥	•	90	۰.	$\star$	[56]
ity	ACC	6 activities (walk, jog, ascend/descend stairs, sit, stand)	• 92	3 🔹 N	29♥	•	90	٠	*	[75]
Activity	ACC	6 activities (walk, jog, run, ascend/descend stairs, sit)	• 97	1 💼 N	20▼	•	90	۰.	$\star$	[123]
	GYR	Opening of a safe or padlock	• 80	1 🔹 N	3▼	♦ K	Ø	۰	*	[86]
Devi Erro	E _ 1	hone 🖣 Wrist Wearable 🖷 Arm Wearable 👢 Foot Wearable 🕇	Knee / Thig	h Wearal	le 🖘	• Waist V	Vearal	ble	67	Glasses


Sebastian Pape, Vanessa Bracamonte, Jacob Leon Kröger, Welderufael Tesfay, Majid Hatamian, Shinsaku Kiyomoto, Kai Rannenberg: A Framework for Privacy Risk Analysis of Sensor-Based Inference Attacks on Smartphones and IoT Wearables, Submitted to TOPS

Sebastian Pape

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## Contact









AR THREAT